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Armies, they say, are always getting ready to fight the last war. Something of 
the same thing may be true of scholarly combatants. Comparative and historical 
sociologists, for example, enjoyed glory days in the 1970s and 1980s while waging war 
on an old sort of functionalism, especially modernization theory, and its counterpart, a 
spuriously universalistic but in fact ethnocentric positivism. Classical modernization 
theory had given widespread credence to a universalistic, unilineal account of social 
and cultural change, one which led harmoniously to modern Western liberalism. His- 
torical sociologists spoke out for greater variability in processes of social change, for 
the impact of earlier developmental patterns on later development efforts, and for 
basic tensions and contradictions in the processes of historical change which made it a 
matter of active struggle rather than automatic unfolding. Where modernization 
theorists emphasized transformations of cultural values and "becoming individually 
modern," the new historical sociologists often bent over backward to avoid cultural in- 
terpretation and socio-psychological accounts. With the bathwater of untenable as- 
sumptions, however, historical sociologists were often ready to throw out the babies of 
meaningful human action and concern for just what amounts to a basic historical 
change, especially an epochal transformation of cultural categories and forms of social 
relat~onshi~.' 
This was not the first time sociologists found themselves constructing an exag- 
gerated dichotomy between culture and society. This time as before, many comple- 
mented it with a further split between action and structure. Previous historical writing, 
especially "old-fashioned" narrative, was accused of suggesting that individuals and 
groups were able somehow to translate their ideologies dii-ectly into historical out- 
comes, that we could understand what happened in the Russian revolution, for ex- 
ample, by understanding what was in Leninys head. It was not that analysts saw no role 
for action. The social structures which made actions possible and the strategies which 
made it rational were both important concerns. It was attempts to interpret what made 
action meaningful which were portrayed as lapses into naive voluntarism or impres- 
sionistic fuzziness. And, of course, there was enough naive voluntarism about to make 
this plausible, just as there were enough culturalists who were repared to present cul- 
ture as an autonomous and free-floating system, independent o F any social organization 
or creative action. It was this, for example, which diminished the effectiveness of calls 
like Geertz's (1958) for takin culture more seriously and avoiding the pitfalls of 
sociologism and psychologism In sociology, professional biases and powers were 
stacked against an interpretative account of culture or action. Phenomenology was as !' much the victim o this as cultural studies. 
.................... 
1. This was certainly not true for all, though few approaches combined both attention to epochal transfor- 
mation and to culture. An account of what makes the modern world categorially distinctive is central to 
Wallerstein's world systems theory. Not coincidentally, perhaps, his work is in one sense among the most 
historical of historical sociologies. That is, it works by studying a process of change in all its phases rather 
than by abstracting several events--e.g. revolutions--from their historical contexts in order to look for 
general features of revolutions. Similarly, historical transformations in cultural and socio-psychological 
processes have been addressed importantly importantly by Sennett (1976) and others. More typical, 
however, are accounts which reduce culture to ideology, and social psychology to rational interests. 
Various other babies also got thrown out with the bathwater of modernization theory--for example atten- 
tion to the built environment or physical infrastructure--e.g. transportation and communications facilitics-- 
on social life. 
2. Geertz, in "Ideology as a Cultural System," was writing with the basic Parsonsian conception of three sub- 
systems of action--social, pcrsonality and cultural--and calling for a renewed appreciation of the relative 
autonomy of the last. 
In the last twenty years, a good deal as been done to join action and structure 
in a less dualistic account of structuration! Culture and society are still widely op- 
posed, and for every sociologist stressing the primacy of social relations, there is a h~s-  
torian, literary critic or symbolic anthropologist prepared to grant culture an utter 
autonomy. Yet, this failure to join cultural and social analysis together makes it much 
harder to grapple with "structuration," and throws enormous impediments in the way of 
grasping basic qualitative transformations in human life. Think, for example, of how 
social as well as cultural factors are needed to understand and substantiate George 
Steiner's comment on qualitative change in 1789: 
In wa s which no preceding historical phenomenon had accomplished, the 
Frenc h Revolution mobilized historicity itself, seein itself as historical, as 
transformative of the basic conditions of human possi ility, as invasive of the 
individual erson. (1988: 150) 
% 
The French Revo f' ution both reflected and furthered a fundamental categorial transfor- 
mation in human self-understanding, a remaking of the person and an expansion of the 
capacities of social action. Yet this was not an event in culture alone, or a cultural out- 
come imaginable separately from the social struggles and material conditions which 
made it possible. To begin to speak not just of "cultural systems" but of communica- 
tions media, literary markets and patronage, shifting relations between public and 
private s aces and identities is to enter a discourse where the cultural cannot be 
separate a from the social. It is within this discourse that we can see the constitution 
and transformation of basic categories of human life. 
The search for a sociology which can take human action seriously without laps- 
ing into a naive voluntarism or a naturalistic rationalism depends upon a complex, his- 
torical understanding of culture. It requires, for example, an understanding of how 
what it means to be a human actor can vary, an understandin which can only be 
gained as part of a culturally and historically specific inquiry into t g e constitution of the 
person.4 At the same time, an actorless account of culture, such as that characteristic 
of most anthropology, and more recently of poststructuralism, cannot provide the neces- 
sary dynamism or normative purchase for either good history or critical theory. Finally, 
an account of the most basic transformations in history must appeal to action of some 
sort if it is to offer an endogenous account of crucial changes, and one which avoids 
either mechanistic determinism or the imputation that change is just an unfolding of 
potentials structurally inherent in a cultural or social relational starting point. And it 
must work in terms of the transformation of cultural categories, not only to avoid a 
simple voluntarism, but to be able to identify what should count as qualitatively new 
rather than merely quantitatively different. Capitalism, thus, is not merely different 
from feudalism on a range of variables such as tendency to expand productivity or 
reliance on money-mediated markets, it is incommensurable with feudalism because 
basic categories and ractices, like labor, either exist only in one, or have sharply dis- 
tinct meanings in eacR, and cannot be carried on in both senses at once. 
In the present paper, I want first to discuss the early orientations and legitima- 
tion struggles of historical sociology, as these have shaped the field's relative inatten- 
tion to the basic problems of culture, action and categorial transformation. Then I will 
turn to look at possible approaches to culture, stressing the poverty of approaches 
3. This term arises much earlier in Pierre Bourdieu's work, but has become more widely associated in 
English with Anthony Giddens. 
4. This is a problem charted early on for sociology in Marcel Mauss's classic--and all but forgetten--essay 
on the category of the person (reprinted with commentary in Carrithers, Collins and Lukes, 1985). The 
major contemporary exploration of this problem is Charles Taylor's 77le Sources ofr l~e Selj (1989). 
which either undercut attention to action, or render culture mere instrumental 
resource, or both, and the importance of historical constitution and transformation of 
categories for social theory. 
THE DOMESTICATION OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 
Conventional approaches to historical sociology generally involve description of 
its methods and/or levels of analysis. Skocpol and Somers (1980; see also Skocpol, 
1984), for example, mobilize Mill to distinguish between parallel demonstration of 
theory, contrast of contexts, and their favored combination of the two: macro-causal 
analysis. There is much good sense in Skocpol and Somers analysis, and reflection of 
our methods is important. But in this and other similar arguments there is also a 
curious tendency to t~ to describe historical sociology in terms of method or approach 
rather than substance. Skocpol and Somers, for example, ask at the outset of their ar- 
ticle "What purposes are pursued--and how--through the specific modalities of contpara- 
five history?" Though they use a variety of substantive studies as examples, however, by 
"purposes pursued" they mean generic categories of methodological purposes. Does 
one pursue parallel demonstration of a theory, for example, or does one seek to con- 
trast contexts? They do not mean what substantive theoretical or empirical problems 
does one aim to solve. 
This methodological emphasis is part of a strategy of disciplinary legitimationm6 
Its protagonists seek, implicitly or explicitly, to convince mainstream sociologists of the 
utility of what they do by playing into the penchant of mainstream sociologists for for- 
mal analytic techniques. They seek, in other words, to give historical sociology a status 
; analogous to statist~cal research methods. There is some ambiguity as to whether this 
portrayal of historical analysis as a method is meant to call attention to the data gather- 
ing process--i.e. historical sociology is like survey methods--or to the data analysis 
process--i.e. historical sociology is like Lisrel. Either way, the substantive importance 
of historical work is underemphasized. Too often, this version of historical sociology 
can also be surprisingly ahistorical. It problematizes neither temporal processes nor 
- the specificities of time and place, but rather amounts to doing conventional sociology 
with data drawn from the past. Similarly, sociologists doing longitudinal analyses with 
.................... 
5. Charles Tilly (1988), for example, has proposed a hierarchy moving from the epochal "world-historical" 
level down through world system analysis and macrohistory to microhistory, with his own preferences lying 
in the latter two categories. This is perfectly plausible, but it reveals the same tendency to categorize 
mainly on non-substantive features of analytic strategy. 
6. Concern for legitimation was not unreasonable, whatever the merits of the specific strategy. 
Mainstream sociology was for a time strongly biased against historical work, influenced heavily by its scien- 
tism and the categories of the methodenstreit, the contrast of putatively nomothetic and idiographic dis- 
ciplines. Too much of this nonsense lives on. At the same time, enough historians are hostile to theory 
and to systematic reflection on the production of their knowledge, to give credence to the disciplinary split 
from their side of the fence. But the emotions of the debate are now fairly remote, and it is a little strange 
to read through the numerous debates over whether and how history and sociology should link up (see 
reviews in Abrams, 1982, and Calhoun, 1987). For all their frequent good sense, these told us little about 
what was to happen when the disciplines did join forces, and they underestimated the needs which would 
remain unmet even when historians and sociologists spoke freely. Gareth Stedman Jones was (along with 
Hobsbawrn) one of the few clearly to articulate the central issue: 
... there is no distinction in principle between history and any of the other "social sciences." The 
distinction is not that between theory and non-theory, but between the adequacy or inadequacy 
of the theory brought to bear. (1976: 305) 
Similarly, we might add, it was naive for optimists to assume that there would be no serious or enduring 
clash of analyic perspectives, that the differences between sociologists and historians were purely com- 
plementary, different sorts of data, say, or mere data vs. analytic techniques. 
data plucked out of historical context now jump on the bandwagon of historical 
sociology--at least when there appear to be benefits. Finally, this account of historical 
work as a method obscures its methodological diversity. Historians and historical 
sociologists may use an enormously wide variety of techniques to gather and analyze 
data. Though they confront certain particular problems, and have certain advantages, 
these are not what set them apart from other sociologists most crucially. Rather, we 
need to emphasize the substantive reasons for doing historical sociology. 
At a minimum, this involves recognizing four sorts of social phenomena which 
cannot be dealt with adequately through purely contemporaneous data sources: 
Some important sociological henomena, like revolutions (Skocpol, 
1979) or settler societies (Mc d ichael, 1984) occur only in a small num- 
ber of cases. This makes it is impossible to study them by most statisti- 
cal techniques, and often difficult or impossible to use interviews, ex- 
eriments or other contemporary research techniques to good effect 
gecause the rarity of the events means that a researcher might have to 
wait decades for the chance and/or it might be difficult to be on the 
scene at the right time. 
2. Some particular events or cases of a broader phenomenon are theoreti- 
cally important or have an intrinsic interest. For example, the case of 
Japan is crucial to all arguments about whether the origins of capitalist 
economic development depended on some specific;cultural features of 
Western civilization (i.e. Europe and societies settled by Europeans). 
Could capitalism have developed elsewhere had Europeans not gotten 
to it first (Anderson, 1974)?~ 
Some phenomena simply happen over an extended period of time. 
Many sociological research toplcs focus on fairly brief events, like mar- 
riages and divorces, adolescence, or the creation of new businesses. 
Other phenomena of great importance, however, happen on longer 
time scales. For exam le, industrialization, state formation, the crea- 
tion of the modern i! orm of family, and the spread of popular 
democracy all took centuries. Simply to look at present-day cases 
would be to examine only specific points in a long trajectory or course 
of development. This could lead not only to faulty generalizations but 
to a failure to grasp the essential historical pattern of the phenomenon 
in question. 
4. For some phenomena changing historical context is a major set of ex- 
planatory variables. For example, changes in the structure of interna- 
tional trade opportunities, political pressures, technologies and the like 
all shape the conditions for economic development. The world context 
in which any one country tries to advance in economic terms will be an 
important determinant of what strategies work, which ones fail, and 
how far development will get (Wallerstein, 1974-88). When Britain be- 
came the world's first industrial capitalist country in the late 18th and 
7. In general, case studies are important supplements to statistical research because they allow detailed 
knowledge of specific instances of a more general phenomenon, as well as statements about the average or 
the overall pattern. Case studies are often misunderstood by those who ask whether cases are "typical" or 
"representative." Case studies are often especially illuminating when focused on non-typical examplcs 
where they point up the limits to theoretical generalizations. 
early 19th centuries, it did not have to compete with any other such 
powerful economic producer. When Japan became an industrial 
capitalist power, there were already many such, and there are even 
more to compete with new capitalist producers today. . 
Even an emphasis on the holes which must be left in a sociology which neglects 
history doesn't fully brin out the importance of historical sociology. The rest of that Z importance lies in the c allenge wh~ch historical sociology poses, ideally, to (a) the 
canonical histories (and anthropolo ies) which have been incorporated into classical 
social theory and its successors, f b) the attempt to apply conce ts and develop P generalizations without attention to their cultural and historical speci icity, and (c) the 
neglect of the historicity of all of social life. It is-for these reasons that all sociologists 
need to be historical, at least in some part. A strategy of disci linary legitimation 
which results in a historical sociology compartmentalized as a sub k'- ield, especially one 
defined vaguely by methodological approach, greatly impoverishes its potential con- 
tributions. 
It would be hard in any case to find the methodolo ical principle which unifies f the major "classics" 'of the resurgence of historical socio ogy In the 1970s. Is it a 
method (or set of methods) which joins The Modem World System- (Wallerstein, 1974), 
The Rebellious Century (Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1974), Lineages of the Absolutist State 
(Anderson, 1975), and States and Modem Revolutions (Skocpol, 1978) in a common dis- 
course or makes them exemplars to generations of graduate students?:. One might at 
least as well point to their common bias in favor of broadly "structuralg'.accounts and 
against either voluntaristic approaches to action or cultural interpretation. Surely, 
however, the importance of the works just mentioned derives primarily from their con- 
tributions to addressing important substantive theoretical or empirical problems or 
questions. But it is worth notin that nearly all the "classics" of the resurgence of his- i torical sociology were works o political economy or political sociology (by a broad 
definition that includes work on class and coll ctive action), and none took cultural 
analysis to be an important part of their project. % 
This emphasis on political and political economic topics reflects both the 
academic struggle against functionalism and modernization theory, and the broader . 
struggles for participatory democracy and various forms of emancipation which shaped 
the resurgence of h~storical sociology twenty years ago. Since the battles of our youth, 
however, we historical sociologists have grown a bit fat with middle age, and 
widespread tenure has muted the agonistic character of our social movement. Struggle 
is something we recall, rather than encourage. It is eas to forget how much the resur- 
gence of historical sociology owed to the politics of t g e late 1960s and early 1970s.. 
Though an emphasis on political research topics remains, the connection between 
academic concerns and broader social struggles seems to have faded. This connection 
never existed for many younger scholars. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, when modernization research was still a formidable an- 
tagonist, historical sociologists often took up a marxist standard in their theoretical 
polemics. Sociologists as different as Wallerstein, Tilly and Skocpol all paid 
obeisances of various sorts to marxist theory, though this seems to have mattered 
deeply only in Wallerstein's case. Perhaps more basically, marxist and marxist- 
influenced historiography exerted a wide influence through the work of Thompson, 
Hobsbawm, Braudel and many others. Even for non-marxist scholars, marxism framed 
8. Here historical sociology is sharply distinct from "the new social history." The latter was also often politi- 
cal or political economic, but no so biased towards the "macro." Indeed, family history was important to 
social history in a way i t  never was to historical sociology (despite several good historical works bjl 
sociologists). 
many of the key research questions. As time went on, however, the specific influence 
of mansism waned in most versions of historical sociology. Not only did Weber loom 
increasingly large, but the links of historical sociology to any general theoretical dis- 
course were attenuated. 
Historical sociologists are still producin important scholarly work, but i t  has 
'R B been su risingly contained within the bounds o an academic specialism. The legitima- tion of t is specialism through methodological claims has allowed substantive biases-- 
like those a ainst the interpretation of culture and meaningful action--to remain im- 
printed on t f~ e field without being subjected to much examination. Take the work of 
Robert Wuthnow, probably America's foremost sociolo ist of culture, and one who has 
recent branched into historical work with a monumenta f study of the Protestant Refor- 
mation, the Enlightenment and European socialism (Wuthnow, 1989). A guiding prin- 
ciple of Wuthnow's work is that it is im ortant for sociologists to approach culture as 
object, and correspondingly to avoid t r, e interpretation of meaning. His historical 
stud attempts to examine its three socio-cultural movements solely through attention 
to t h e social factors affecting the production, selection and institutionalization of 
dominant or enduring ideologies. Wuthnow debunks arguments that these complex 
ideologies are mere reflections of specific groups like rising bourgeoisie or specific 
material forces like markets. "Ideas are shaped but their social situations and yet 
manage to disengage from these situations" (1989: 5). More positively, he shows how 
economic expansion provided resources which had their main cultural effect by facilitat- 
ing the growth of state agencies. These agencies transferred resources to cultural 
producers (patronage remaining a more important source of support than markets for 
cultural commodities). They enlarged the size of potential audiences by providing 
education and employment of many of those educated. They provided the focal point 
for new public spheres focused on issues raised by state policy, and called forth conten- 
tion among cultural producers for state favors and attention. New state elites, 
moreover, weakened the ideological grip of longer established, especially landed, 
elites. This is all important. But note what factors Wuthnow feels constrained not to 
consider by virtue of his calling as sociologist: The intentions of individual actors, the 
force of ideas themselves, the fit between innovative ideas and existing cultural tradi- 
tions, the practical problems which made people open to shifting from one way of think- 
ing to another. Wuthnow's approach to culture without action or meaning keeps it well 
within the sociological mainstream. The fact that the study is of historical movements 
(or that they form a chronological series) becomes coincidental. These are just cases 
for exploring the more general phenomenon of how mov ments of ideas reach critical 
take-off points (reason #I above for historical sociolo )! In fact, of course, the three 
cases are all fascinating and much of the interest of t !?' e book inheres in the historical 
9. In a strong sense, in fact, Wuthnow's case studies are really examples: 
It seems most useful, therefore, to specify the .range of relevant considerations at a relatively 
abstract level of generality, and then with the benefit of empirical examples to suggest at a more 
concrete level the particular manifestations of those abstractions that are most likely to become 
operative. (1989: 543) 
Though the book comes with effusive dust-jacket praise from Skocpol, it is worth noting that in this respect 
Wuthnow violates Skocpol's methodological strictures. He produces something very much like Smelser's 
(1959) "black box" theory of social change-4.e. a general account into which specific cases are fitted. And 
though he does develop substantial case studies for comparison and contrast, this does not take the form 
of systematically comparing specific variables among the cases. One must take each case as a whole, 
within Wuthnow's classification of cases; he does not present the evidcnce on, say the relationship betwecn 
economic growth and voting patterns, in a systematically comparative form. 
importance of the Reformation, Enlightenment and socialism. But Wuthnow cannot 
admit this, for it places the stress on the interpretation of the substance of the cases 
rather than on his methodological principles for eneral theoretical development. B In the early years of the resurgence o historical sociology, methodological ' 
claims had not been so predominant. At least as important was a re-engagement with 
classical social theory, a challenge to the Parsonsian construction of the canon. Most 
glaringly, Parsons had written Marx out of sociolo 's canon; Simmel and others were i? similarly excluded. Parsons had also produced s ewed and somewhat impoverished 
readings of the main thinkers he did ~nclude. Last but not least, funct~onalist or- 
thodoxy had subscribed to a notion of disciplinary division of labor which served to 
separate sociological discourse from that of anthropology (the proper domain of cul- 
tural analysis) and psycholo (personality). Political science and economics fell into 
a P P' the roperly sociolo ical rea m, Parsons claimed, and so closer relationships with those fie1 s were inevitab e. The behavioral revolution in political science so devalued nor- 
mative political theory, however, that many political scientists, as well as sociologists, 
lost connection with it. 
One of the losses in this construction of the canon was the idea of basic histori- 
cal tra,nsformations. Sociologists, political scientists and economists were primarily con- 
cerned with the operation of the existing institutions of modern societies. They did not 
focus on the historical transformations which brought those societies into being or on 
the idea that they might be fundamentally transformed. Modernization theorists 
looked outside this terrain, but for the most part dropped the idea of basic historical 
transformations for a notion of evolutionary continuum. One of the most important 
impacts of marxism, when it was revitalized in the 1960s, was that it introduced such a 
notion of basic transformations into social science discourse. Marxism was also a very 
interdisciplinary discursive field, which played an important role in overcoming at least 
some of the blinders imposed by disciplinary boundaries. 
The important role of marxism in the resurgence of historical sociology did not 
keep culture or the interpretation of meaningful human action in the foreground, but it 
did help to maintain a central place for the problematic of basic historical change. 
Marxism is one of the theories most attuned to the need to specifyclear breaks be- 
tween epochs, and to develop historical specific conceptual tools for understanding 
each.1° This is part, for example, of what Hobsbawm (1971) meant by distinguishing 
the history of society from social history in general. Social historians may study in- 
numerable ways in which people are social; they may identify a host of commonalties 
or divergences in the routines of dail life. Simply looking at these specifics, however, 
does not give us a grip on basic trans r ormations in fundamental forms of social arrange- 
ments. Consider, for example, the notion of "everyday forms of resistance," made 
popular recently by the "subaltern studies" group. There are indeed innumerable ways 
In which subalterns may resist the will of those who dominate them, or at least may 
resist submerging their identities in the hegemonic culture imposed on them. By 
means of dialect and the outright refusal of discourse, they insulate their worlds from 
the scrutiny of those from dominant groups. They move slow1 , instill distrust in their 
children and develop a range of other "weapons of the weak l Scott, 1984). This is an 
important fact of social life. But noting it, or distinguishing tactics of manoeuvre from 
10. It should not be thought that all manrists are equally attuned to this need. It has been common for 
many to turn mancism into a more or less evolutionary theory, and/or to treat the basic concepts of Marx's 
account of capitalism as transhistorical. A category like labor, however, gains its full theoretical meaning 
only in terms of the whole categorial structure of capitalism, however; its meaning is fundamentally altered 
if it is reduced to "work," in the sense in which productive activity is characteristic of all historical periods. 
See Postone (forthcoming) for a sophisticated reading of Marx's mature theory as historically specific to 
capitalism. 
position, does not take awa from the observation that organized, sustained and 
cumulative political action g y such subalterns has been historically exceptional, 
restricted primarily to the modern era, and effective in securing changes in ways which 
everyda resistance could never rival. As Hobsbawm put it elsewhere: 
"Ylhe poor," or indeed any subaltern grou , become a subject rather than an 
object of history only through formalize f collectivities, however structured. 
Everybod alwa s has families, social relations, attitudes towards sexuality, 
childhoo d' and d' eath, and all the other things that keep social historians use- 
fully employed. But, until the past two centuries, as traditional historiography 
shows, "the poor" could be neglected most of the time by their "betters," and 
therefore remained largely invisible to them, precisely because their active 
impact on events was occasional, scattered and impermanent. (1978: 48) 
This capacity to organize, to create institutionalized forces for change, of course de- 
pended on other social changes, including the growth of the state and capitalist in- 
dustry. Changes like these help to define categorial breaks in history, as distinct from 
mere differences and fluctuations. 
Marxism is not unique in stressing such breaks. Foucault, unquestionably in- 
fluenced by Marx (and Hegel) though equally unquestionably no marxist in his mature 
work, laid great stress on the discovery of historical "ruptures." Modernization theory 
itself proposed at least one set of changes so basic as to amount to a fundamental trans- 
formation, the defining "before" and "after" of tradition and modernity (though after 
this one historical break all further change was seen in terms of an evolutionary 
continuum). For the most part, however, historians and sociologists have rejected, or 
at least abandoned, consideration of such breaks. Even the fate of Foucault's emphasis 
on ruptures is instructive. Foucault has become enormously influential, in part 
precisely because historians are prepared to take a search of the power/knowledge link 
and other fundamental categories of Foucauldian analysis into virtually any and every 
conceivable historical context. Indeed, Foucault himself did this in the latter volumes 
of his History of Sexuality, abandoning the argument about the distinctiveness of mod- 
ernity which was so central to his earlier work. So used, Foucault's categories become, 
ironically, as universalist as rational choice theory or any other product of the En- 
lightenment discourses he began by criticizing. 
This use of Foucault is particularly American and fits with a more general ten- 
dency to turn French structuralist discourse into a normalized academic doctrine. 
Where the French structuralists and "poststructuralists" argued in a strong polemical 
relationship to marxism, phenomenology and other analytic strategies, their American 
disciples have tended, ironically, to reproduce "deconstructionism" and 
"postmodernism" as monological discourses of truth, losing sight of the agonistic dimen- 
slon of their origins (see Weber, 1987, for a perceptive discussion focused on litera 
criticism). Of course the poststructuralists (to take a single name for this tendency 7 
argue about the importance of difference and conflict, they do not ignore them. But 
what they do is to universalize these features of discourse and culture, making it impos- 
sible to grasp differences in the production and character of difference, for example, 
and obscuring attention to other dimensions of culture and social life. 
At its best, one of the oints which Foucault's work might have made, was that 
we need an understanding o ? the historical constitution of basic categories of under- 
standing, and we need to see the costs entailed in their construction. Foucault's work 
was not very widely read among historical sociologists, though, and at least part1 for 
an instructive reason. Foucault appeared in the guise of a student of culture, ancrhis- 
torical sociology was still locked in a reaction formation against the cultural analysis of 
modernization theory. Yet, this failure to take culture seriously not only impeded ad- 
dressing basic categorical breaks in history, it hindered historical sociology's shift of at- 
tention to the emerging central issue of the constitution of actors. Or, put another way, 
even though many historical sociologists wanted to study collective action, they 
adopted a kind of objectivism and failed to give adequate attention to culture. This ob- 
jectivism could be equally manifest in rational cholce theory or structuralism, which 
were two sides of the same coin in mainstream sociology. In the work of Tilly, for ex- 
ample, collective action is the roduct of interests (in an analysis not far from rational 
choice theory) and structure, put seldom of culture. More precisely, Tilly does not 
pursue a cultural analysis of the constitution of interests or structures. 
Though one of the early strengths of historical sociology was to reopen a dis- 
course with and about classical social theory, this engagement with large scale theory 
did not remain central. Historical sociologists focused on a set of utatively empirical P objects--states, revolutions, class formation, welfare policies, amilies, the world 
economy--and shied away from participation in theoretical discourse. They made rela- 
tively little effort to situate these objects in broader theories of the whole of social life, 
or contrasts with very different socio-cultural formations. Most historical sociology 
remained within the classical sociological traditions insofar as it took its basic topics 
and questions from the attempt to understand the change processes, major events and 
international impacts of Western modernity. Very few historical sociologists studied 
earlier epochs or parts of the histories of non-western societies which had little to do 
with the impact of the West or the modern world system (Mann, 1986, is an exception). 
Though the new wave of historical sociologists emphasized variation and comparison 
more, they actually did less work in Third World settin s than their predecessors f among modernization researchers. Historical sociology o the last twenty years has 
spared itself important challenges by focusing overwhelmingly on the modern West, 
especially on the more industrial countries. Like its predominantly enipiricist charac- 
ter, this helped to keep it in or near the sociological mainstream. 
. The same is true of social history, of course, despite Hobsbawrn's anticipation 
twenty years ago that "social history can never be another specialization like economic 
- or other hyphenated histories because its subject matter cannot be isolated" (1971: 5). 
Social history has indeed been compartmentalized. It too has lost its insurgent, cutting 
edge character. To many historians, cultural history appears to have taken that place 
(Hunt, 1989). Feminist scholarship is another, overlapping, candidate, and recently 
feminist historians have in fact debated whether or not they ought to throw in their lot 
with social history or maintain a broader engagement with the discipline as a whole 
(Scott, 1988; Tilly, 1989; Bennett, 1989). Both social history and historical sociology 
have ceased to be intellectual movements and become mere subfields. They have 
senior gatekeepers and junior aspirants, contending schools of thought and prominent 
professors promoting the careers of their students. Their protagonists fight not for 
their academic lives, or for radical social or political movements, but for the next 
departmental appointment. In both cases, this is unfortunate in several ways, although 
good for graduate students seeking jobs. 
None of this is to say that the old enemies should become heroes. Modern- 
ization theory deserved the attack it received. And in this age of collapsing com- 
munism, it is still important to challenge theories of unilinear progress. Nor have the 
old virtues lost all their lustre. Finding a middle path between overly abstract grand 
theory and the overly grand pretensions of abstracted empiricism is still one of the im- 
ortant accomplishments of historical sociology (following Mills, 1958). But the old 
lghts between manists and functionalists, dependistas and modernization theorists 
have gone the way of decks of punched computer cards and the double-knit leisure 
suits once all too common at ASA meetin s. Key debates are now more apt to concern k modernism and postmodernism, cultura interpretation and rational action models. 
Historical sociology (whether practiced by sociologists or historians or others) has im- 
portant, indeed crucial, contributions to make to these discourses. Reflection on the 
project of historical sociology, however, tends to neglect the way in which it can shape 
- 
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such basic discourses, and help to make them more than idle academic competitions, 
and to emphasize rather a view of the field which reflects its struggle for acceptance fif- 
teen years ago. 
HUNTING IS NOT THOSE HEADS OF THE WALL 
By the 1980s, cultural nal sis was enjoyin a renewed vogue in history, if  not so 
clearly in historical sociology?' k e  influence o f structuralism was important (and in 
some cases also interpretative cultural anthropology, such as the work of Geertz). His- 
torical sociology and social theory were informing the work of historians less, and con- 
versely, historical sociologists were neglecting the new cultural discourse in history, just 
as they had the advent of poststructuralism and other cultural discourses before it. 
History may seem an odd place for sociologists to look for an adequate ap- 
proach to culture, especially since historians have been busying themselves for a 
decade with appropriating ideas about culture from anthropology, literary criticism and 
the interdisciplinary discourse of poststructuralism. Certainly sociologists will gain also 
by looking directly to these other sources, but history is essential. It is essential be- 
cause the approach to culture which is needed is one which stresses the specificity of 
time and place, the embeddedness of all thou ht in social relations and processes of 
becoming, the construction of culture throug human action, and its i~stitution in 
forms of social practice. I do not mean to suggest, in other words, that historians have 
a ready-made account of culture which, like a mongoose, will kill our theoretical 
snakes for us. In fact, I think the "new cultural history" has in many ways committed it- 
self to a poststructuralist, postmodernist conceptualization which is flawed first of all by 
cutting culture apart from sociality rather than overcoming the dichotomy between cul- 
ture and society, and secondly by so universalizing the category of difference that it be- 
comes pseudohistorical (Calhoun, 1990). The reason to look for an approach to cul- 
ture in h i f ~ o z  is that the approach to culture we need is one which is intrinsically 
historical. etting some purchase on culture--as meaningful activity, not mere objec- 
tive products--must be among the next tasks of a comparative historical sociology 
which has avoided this dimension of human life as part of its reaction formation 
against modernization theory. 
Culture is a complex topic, of course, and a troubling one. Lately some 
anthropologists have proposed doing without it altogether (Abu-Lughod, 1990).13 Two 
criticisms have particular merit: that culture is too often made into all-encompassing 
(and therefore meaningless) category, and that scholars too readily assume that culture 
has some sort of internal systematicity. Despite these criticisms, and despite the fact 
that I cannot to justice to the complexity of culture, I will retain it as the best signifier I 
know of the range of concerns I want to talk about. My intention is to explore three 
"professional deformations" which shape historical sociologists' efforts in this arena. 
The first is the idea that one can or should avoid culture. The second is the notion that 
culture is simply a topical area referring to certain objective products of human 
.................... 
11. Cultural analysis was growing in sociology, though more modestly than in history, and overwhelmingly 
through studies of the production, selection and dissemination processes of cultural objects, not through 
partially interpretive studies of cultural phenomena themselves. 
12. In this sense, I take my call--or search--to be similar to that Sherry Ortner (1984) describes and advo- 
cates for an anthropology focussed on practices. I too think that taking practice seriously entails a histori- 
cal sensibility--though I think attention to practices cannot be the whole of this sensibility. 
13. The attempt to do away with conccpts is a recurrent theme in anthropology, an attcmpt to pursue 
purity of relations with The Other by a kind of theoretical prophylaxis. 1 would prcfer more historically in- 
formed critique of concepts.and lcss bclief in the possibility of doing away with thcm. 
activity.14 The third is the idea that culture should be addressed only in subjectless, ac- 
torless, "structuralist" guise. Each of these last two makes culture into the the heads on 
the wall, as it were, rather than the hunt. 
We can get an idea of the issues from examining an exchange between William 
Sewell, a leading cultural historian, and Theda Skocpol, one of the most influential his- 
torical sociologists and a staunch structuralist. 
Sewell opened the exchange with a critique of Skocpol's widely influential States 
and Social Revolutions, in which he sought to position himself as the advocate of a 
more sophisticated and complex analytic approach which allows for a better grasp of ' 
culturally and historically concrete phenomena. Reco nizin that culture has been dis- 
missed by historical sociologists (and most other socio f ogists f as too closely linked to a 
voluntarist account of agency, he argues that attention to culture need not involve 
theories which take the conscious intentions of agents to be historically or sociologi- - 
tally decisive. 
Sewell begins by declaring his appreciation for Skocpol's book, particularly for 
her a ~ ~ r o a c h  to the ~roblem of multiple causation. He praises her for avoiding both 
the S'c;lla of a "hierirchical" strategy'which claims the redominance of somesingle 
causal factor (e.g. class struggle) over all others and t Charybdis of a "narrative" 
strategy which simply tries to recount the course of a revolution in some approximation 
to its concrete complexity. Both these approaches, Sewell agrees with Skocpol, are in- 
sufficiently anal ic. The narrative strategy treats causes only as they make themselves 
felt in the deve r opment of the story, which makes it hard to grasp their autonomous 
- dynamics, while the hierarchicalistrategy only examines fully the causal dynamics of 
one factor. Skocpol, by contrast, approached causation as a matter of "conjunctural, 
unfolding interactions of originally separately determined processes" (1979: 320, n. 16). 
.. In particular, Skocpol stressed the independent but interrelated causal importance of 
class struggle (which she argued had been exaggerated by many previous analysts), 
state formations, and international relations (the latter two of which she argues need to 
figure much more prominently in analyses of revolutions). Sewell's complaint is that 
Skocpol failed to recognize ideology as an important autonomous causal factor. 
Skocpol ruled out the autonomous power of ideology on the basis of a rather 
simplistic test; she showed that "any line of reasoning that treats revolutionary 
ideologies as blueprints for revolutionary outcomes cannot sustain scrutiny" (1979: 
170). In other words, the outcome of the French revolution, for example, cannot be 
understood as the product of ideology of any particular group of revolutionary par- 
ticipants or leaders-Jacobins, Girondins, sans-culottes, etc. On this basis, she con- 
cludes that the cognitive content of ideology has no predictive power as an independ- 
ent variable in explaining revolutions. Her error, Sewell suggests, lies in assuming that 
the only way ideology could be important is through the predictive power of the ideol- 
ogy of some particular group or set of actors. But ideology need not be identified with 
any actors in particular. He claims authority from Althusser, Foucault, Geertz and Wil- 
liams for an alternative view of ideology as the anonymous and impersonal o eration P of ideological state apparatuses, e istemes, cultural systems or structures o feeling. 
This view of ideology is structural, & suggests, just as are the forces of class, state and 
international relations which form the basis of Skocpol's analysis. Skocpol, therefore, 
dealt with only a "naive voluntarist conception of ideology" (Sewell, 1985: 61). Sewell 
agrees that this can be dismissed, but argued that in the more structuralist 
(Althusserian) sense, ideology must be understood as constitutive of the social order. 
.................... 
14. "Hunting is not those heads on the wall," is the title of a brilliant essay on writing by Leroi Jones 
(Amiru Baraka). 
Sewell goes on to try to demonstrate the importance of ideology through a sum- 
mary account of the French Revolution of 1789. His account turns on an understand- 
ing of ideolo as the overall structure of discursive and cognitive arrangements affect- 
ing action. #us the prerevolutionary situation which was shaped by the conflicts be- 
tween traditional monarchical ideology and the Enlightenment, both of which were 
working parts of the Old Regime. The difficulties of traditional monarchical ideology 
were brought into relief by the growing influence of Enlightenment, but it was not until 
the revolutionary crisis that the fundamental opposition between the two became clear. 
The revolution smashed the traditional monarchical ideology, replacin it with that of 
the Enlightenment, but simultaneous1 opened up the potential politica significance of K B ideological fissures within the Enlig tenment. Sewell tries to show several crucial 
moments of the revolution which can only be understood in terms of an autonomous 
ideological dynamic. For example, he suggests that the Estates General, having not 
been called since 1614, had a solely ideological existence in 1788; the necessity of reviv- 
ing it, which provided much of the occasion for the revolution, was an ideological neces- 
sity. Sewell places considerable emphasis on the night of August 4th, in which he sees 
the National Assembly first forced to destroy seigneurial privileges by the pressure of 
peasant class struggle, and then, "moved forward by an overwhelmin urge for ideologi- 
cal consistency" to destroy the entire existing system of privilege 8 1985: 69). Where 
Skocpol sees the night.of August 4th as simply an outcome of the peasant revolt, Sewell 
insists that "it was a crucial turning point in two quite distinct revolutionary processes: 
a class process of peasant revolt and an ideological process of conceptual transforma- 
tion" (1985: 70). August 4 brought closure to the peasants' class struggle by assenting 
to the destruction of the seigneurial system. And it brought an end to the ideological 
dynamic of tension between Enlightenment and corporate monarchical principles. But 
it began another ideological dynamic: the elaboration of Enlightenment metaphysical 
principles into a new revolutionary social and political structure. Echoes of this 
process continued to be felt for years. Some of those which Sewell cites as essentially 
ideological were the Revolution's treatment of the Church, and the attempt to reform 
measurement and experience of time and space by use of a combination of decimal cal- 
culations, natural facts and reference to revolutionary virtues. The ideological revolu- 
tion thus "changed drastically when the Enlightenment idiom became the dominant 
idiom of overnment" (1985: 71). For example, Sewell generally supports and deploys E against S ocpol the recent claims of Francois Furet that the Terror was an inevitable 
product of the ideology of the Revolution, not a response to national peril or the 
product of class struggle. This Revolutionary ideology was not, according to Furet and 
Sewell, the ideology of any particular group contending for power, but rather it was col- 
lective and anonymous. Robespierre became a central figure only because he became 
its embodiment, not because he had special skills or represented a distinct set of class 
interests. Sewell criticizes Furet only for exaggeration leading him to make ideology 
the sole cause of radicalization in the revolution, rather than a complement to class 
struggle and the exigencies of war. The ideological consequences of the Revolution in- 
clude, Sewell suggests, the modern notion of nationalism and the very idea of revolu- 
tion itself as the overthrow of one government by the people and its replacement by 
another government. Indeed, Sewell would go even further than this and argue that 
the definition of "social revolution" include the ideological presence of a totalitarian 
ambition to restructure all of social life, from top to bottom and across the board. 
In reply, Skocpol accepts Sewell's criticism of her earlier treatment of ideology, 
but challenges his argument that the concept of ideology should be used in an entirely 
impersonal, anonymous and structuralist sense. Ironically, given her re utation as an R extreme proponent of structural analysis and the frequent criticism of er neglect of 
both culture and intentional action, Skoc 01 argues for these notions against Sewell's P ideological structuralism. The central di ficulty with Sewell's argument, Skocpol con- 
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and anonymous, and ideolop and cultural idioms as these are brought into use by 
specific actors in revolutionary transformations. Skocpol suggests that the 
"structuralism" of States and Social Revolution has often been misunderstood. She did 
not mean "to read intentional group action out of revolutions, only to situate i t  theoreti- 
cally for the explanatory urposes at hand" (1985: 87). I t  is in this sense that she main- 
tained the notion that i 'I' eolop (understood as the orientation and intentions of any 
particular group) cannot predict the outcomes of revolutionary struggles. The struggles 
are real, and are active creations of people action with ideologies, but their outcomes 
are predicted largely by the "structural" factors of class power, state formation and inter- 
national relations. In her re ly to Sewell (as in a recent article on the Iranian revolu- f tion, 1982), Sko 01 acknow edges that she mi ht profitably have aid more attention b i to the les of the revolutions s e examined. But s e is at pains to dis- 
of ideological struggles--clashes between groups of people 
putting forward different olitical pro rams or ways of understanding current 
"cultural system" in general. 
B f situations--from Sewell's un erstanding o ideology as more or less synonymous with 
Skocpol identifies Sewell's argument essentially with cultural anthropolop and 
particularly with the work of Clifford Geertz, who indeed has been a major in uence 
on Sewell. But Sewell's arguments are part of a broader current of thought which links 
a variety of theoretical constructs and interpretative approaches. Michel Foucault is 
perhaps the foremost representative of this line of understanding which stresses that 
culture is never neutral, but always a structure of domination. In this, there is con- 
siderable unity between the "structuralism" of Althusser and the "post-structuralism" of 
Foucault and a wide variety of contemporary theorists and interpreters of culture. It is 
an indication of how little this line of thought had, in 1985, entered into mainstream 
American sociological discourse that Skocpol fails to notice it as the background to 
Sewell's approach to ideolo . Recognizing it, however, gives greater significance to P' the dispute between Skocpo and Sewell, for it points up that among the issues at stake 
is the status of action in socio-cultural theory and analysis. 
Taken to an extreme (which Sewell does not do) the "decentered" analyses of 
the structuralists and poststructuralists remove so completely the active role of agents 
that they eliminate the possibility of most sorts of nor ative critique, and most under- 
standin s of how history might have been otherwise.'fnSkocpol, thus, points out that in 
her un d erstanding, structures are certainly not actors; Sewell implicitly adopts an ap- 
proach in which cultural structures are the independent source of their own transforma- 
tion, a sort of unfolding. Ideology thus acts through agents (cf., e.g. Furet's account of 
Robespierre) rather than being made and put forward by actors. One is reminded of 
Althusser's treatment of human subjects as "supports" of the more fundamentally real 
structural formations. This account would doubtless make Sewell uncomfortable, for 
although his primary thrust in the article under examination is structuralist- 
poststructuralist, he does distance himself from the more complete opposition to volun- 
tarism espoused by others swimming in that stream. He writes, for example, that 
"ideological utterances, like all other forms of social action, require the exercise of 
human will. To say that an ideology "is structured" or "is a structure" is not to say that it 
is inaccessible to human volition, but that ideological action is shaped by reexisting P ideological (and other) realities" (1985: 60). Here Sewell associates himsel with Gid- 
dens' notion of the "dual" character of all social structures--at once constraining and 
enabling. Nonetheless, in his critique of Skocpol, Sewell goes out of his way to stress 
the anonymous character of ideologies and processes of historical change; he is happy 
.................... 
15. This issue is widely debated with regard to Foucault and poststructuralist thought; the critiques are 
generally consonant with E.P. Thompson's (1978) attack on  Althusserian structuralism. 
to see these as "unintended consequences of purposive social action" (in Merton's 
phrase) and to stress that the number of actors is so large as to make the contributions 
of particular individuals or roups more or less negligible. 
Writing elsewhere, %well (1986) has made a similar argument a key basis for 
challengin James Coleman's (1986) argument that historical (and more enerally cul- 
tural) exp f anation typically neglects the crucial sociological problem o f relating in- 
dividual courses of action to large scale collective results (see Wacquant and Calhoun, 
1989). Sewell argues, against Coleman, that historical explanation is, par excellence, 
explanation of the unintended atterns by which the actions of individuals have large 
scale collective consequences. fi owever, the discussion of the French revolution which 
Sewell offers to illustrate his case against Skocpol seems precisely to be a case of the 
argument from collective henomenon to collective phenomenon which Coleman con- 
demns, and of which he c 1 arges modern historians are frequently guilty. This, for ex- 
ample, is at least a very lausible reading (and it seems to be Skocpol's reading) of 
Sewell's claim that "ideo f) ogy must ... be understood as constitutive of social order" 
(1985: 61). In other words, Sewell does not say that ideology (or culture) is partially 
constitutive of actors whose actions make or change social arrangements (which, in 
turn, may be more or less orderly)--as we might, for example, expect Pierre Bourdieu 
to say. On the contrary, in his critique of Skocpol, Sewell comes very near to making 
ideology (or culture) the kind of holistic category which bypasses the role of human ac- 
tors (individual or collective) in making history. That this is presumably not Sewell's 
intention does not make it any less the result of his analytic categories (perhaps an in- 
stance of the unintended consequences of ideolo ). Y Against this, Skocpol argues that one s ould adopt a narrower definition of 
ideology as "idea systems deployed as self-conscious political arguments by identifiable 
political actors" (1985: 91). And, she suggests, we should add a third analytic concept, 
"cultural idioms" which "have a longer-term, more anonymous, and less partisan exis- 
tence than ideologies" (ibid.). Actors use cultural idioms in constructing ideologies. 
On this basis, Skocpol hopes to be able to attend to the interplay of intentional and 
nonintentional aspects of ideas in the course of revolutions. Neither ideology nor cul- 
tural idioms, in her usage, constitute the sort of holistic, integrated system which 
Sewell's usage seems (at least at points) to suggest. Thus, for example, she sees no 
basis for attributing "nationalism" to "some Enlightenment-inspired cultural code" but 
instead points out how deliberately Napoleon and associated actors amalgamated 
"nationalism with contradictory strands of revolutionary political symbolism in order to 
stabilize a bureaucratic-authoritarian state without the aid of an hegemonic political 
party" (1985: 93). Analysis of the role of ideology and cultural idioms "requires that we 
examine very concretely the consciousness and talk of particularly situated acting 
groups, and that we take seriously the essentially political tasks they were trying to ac- 
complish during the Revolution" (1985: 94; see discussion of such Revolut~onary dis- 
course in Hunt, 1984). Skocpol's reading of the political purposes is still very state- 
centered, which leads her to underestimate the force of Sewell's point about the very 
large amount of revolutionary effort which went into tasks such as reforming measure- 
ment and categorization of t~me  and space. Nonetheless, she raises a cruc~al analytic 
issue. 16 
16. It is ironic that Skocpol, whose work in general has downplayed both culture and intentional activity, 
should provide in her reply the occasion for noting how of Sewell's implicit theory of culture underplays in- 
tergroup contestation. It is also appropriate, however, in two senses. First, if Coleman and rational choice 
theory represent one major and central force within mainstream American sociology, Skocpol and other 
"structural" macrosociologists represent anothcr such force (albeit more internally hc~erogencous). Al- 
though there have always been individuals doing sociological research on culture, i t  is only within the last 
three or four years that it has becomc a significant collective enterprise within thc mainstrcarn of the dis- 
cipline. As  sociological attention to culture grows, howcvcr, i t  bccomcs apparent that what sort of cultur:rl 
Much of the force of Sewell's (1986) critique of Coleman derives from the 
latter's neglect of culture, including such problems as establishing the comparability of 
interests across cultural contexts and understanding cultural differences in the constitu- 
tion of individuals and collective actors. At the same time, however, Sewell's critique 
of Sko 01 suggests weaknesses in the possibility of attending to these very concerns 9 within is own theory of culture. The structuralist/poststructuralist perspective 
adopted by Sewell is notorious for making cross-cultural translation and comparison vir- 
tually impossible (see Calhoun, forthcoming b) thou h again, Sewell's empirical inten- 
tion is in part to encourage comparative research. %I e approach Sewell advocates is 
useful for drawing attention to the nonneutral way in which broad cultural patterns 
shape discourse and action. But by emphasizing the internal systematicity of such cul- 
tural patterns--ideologies, in his term--over the role of human action, he at least im- 
licitly downplays the creative and contestative significance of action itself. In this way, 
pis analysis comes to look more like the structuralist anthro olo ical history practiced f f by Sahlins (1985) than like the dual approach to the interp ay o structure and action 
advocated by Giddens (1985) or the attempt to overcome this dichotomy put forward 
by Bourdieu (1990). 
With regard to Sewell's specific discussion of the French Revolution, for ex- 
ample, we might ask where the "overwhelming urge for ideological consistency" (1985: 
69) came from. It seems odd to give it the status of prime mover, especially since such 
urges seem to have been rare in history. Sewell's structuralism offers purchase on cer- 
tain constitutive tensions in the Revolution, but cannot address the sense in which basic 
transformations of culture and social relations were involved (see the quote from 
Steiner above). Conversely, Skocpol's response to Sewell shows her complementing 
her structural account with a remarkably voluntarist position. But she is equally unable 
to grap le with qualitative historical change. No doubt Napoleon manipulated P nationa ism, but did he invent it? Can we understand a phenomenon like nationalism 
any better as a merely instrumental ploy than as a reflection of the Enlightenment's cul- 
tural code? For Sko 01 to give more substance to her account of action, she (like ra- 
tional choice theorists '7 need to show how interests are constituted: for example, why 
Frenchmen can be moved by Napoleonic appeals to nationalism. Such an account will 
turn in part on the cultural construction of identity, though this process must be seen as 
part and parcel of social relationships and social action not free-floating in a separate 
realm of ideas. As Sewell suggests, it is hard to ima ine an account of narrowly inter- 
ested action (i.e. interests simply in power or profit f doing justice to the question of 
why French revolutionaries devoted so much energy and emotion to trying to remake 
French .culture. But though their activity can only be interpreted in relation to a 
broader web of meanings, it should not be seen mere1 as the occasion for working out 
those meanings. Actions are not just instanciations o i' cultural codes, nor is culture so 
clearly systemic that we can tell what actions to expect solely from an internal analysis 
of it. Phenomena like nationalism are social and cultural at the same time; they are 
constituted as a meaningful categories and significant and effective practices through a 
concrete historical process. 
THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION OF CATEGORIES 
theory sociologists use makes a great deal of difference. Many American sociologists of culture are essen- 
tially "structuralist" in the sense that they seek to explain cultural patterns by reference to external, puta- 
tively extra-cultural social factors (e.g. Judith Blau, 1989; Wuthnow, 1989). Others are "structuralist" in 
more the sense of Sewell, stressing the internal structure or systematicity of culture; they are apt to treat 
culture as an explanation (perhaps only partial) for social action. Still others, however, are attempting to 
overcome this dualism between 'culture' and 'society'. For most, this would seem to be something which 
can only be done through a theory of action, but a theory of action which does not (like rational choice 
theory) make untenable assumptions about the prccultural universal individualistic constitution of actors. 
Poststructuralism is today's preferred approach to culture.'' But, more 
generally than just in Sewell's work, we need to see three closely linked weaknesses to 
poststructuralism. The first is that it works within and perpetuates the se aration of 
culture and society. The second is that it grants little if any role to action. tI hese both 
stem from an internal approach to culture, one which stresses its unity and closure as a 
system, even if that is only for the purpose of deconstructin it. As Weber (1987) has 
argued, the very claim to deconstruct a text is a move whic ! holds that text within an 
interpretative framework or community, which fixes it within a context. Poststruc- 
turalism, in its reliance on texts and textual metaphors and in its general anti- 
subjectivist analytic strategies, constructs culture as a system of objects. It is in this 
sense sharply o posed to a view of culture and society alike as matters of practice. 
Bourdieu's wor!, for example, (though arguably in many ways an instance of 
"poststructuralism," insofar as that creation of English language analysts has any pur- 
chase on actual French schools of thought) shows not only how action participates in 
the reproduction as well as creation or change of structure, but also how the categories 
of social and cultural analysis merge in an account of the forms of practice. The forms 
are that part--usually the vast majority--of action which can be theorized and properly 
analyzed; beyond them lies the particularity or singularity of action which can only be 
described. 
Even Bourdieu, however, does not offer all the strength we need to counter the 
third weakness of poststructuralism. This is its universalizing of difference. When dif- 
ference is universalized it is, ironically, trivialized. When any grouping of com- 
monalties is simply the normalizing discourse of power, we lose ouricapacity to distin- 
guish greater or lesser differences. This is linked to the notorious incapacity of 
poststructuralist work to ground its own (or an other) normative orientations (see 
Calhoun, forthcoming b). Shifting to a theory o r practice helps. It reveals, first of all, 
that as activity culture has a temporal direction, a history. Shifts from one position to 
another are not made from among the choices in an abstract field of possibilities (as 
both lo ical positivists and poststructuralists often imply). Rather, they are practical f moves rom weaker to stronger ositions, they are made to solve practical problems. 
In the realm of knowledge, Char f es Taylor (1989) has called this "epistemic gain." But 
outside epistemology a similar process is also at work, obligating us to understand the 
meaning of ideas, or political actions, or institutions at least partially in terms of their 
creation. We need to grasp them not 'ust as they are, in a static sense, but as they 
could have been arrived at in a historica i' process. "It is essential to an adequate under- 
standing of certain problems, questions, issues, that one understand them genetically" 
(Taylor, 1984: 17). In other words, we understand a position by knowing why and from 
where or what one might have moved to it.18 
In addition, working in a theory of practice points up that not all differences 
necessitate clashes or resolutions. We can and do allow many happily to coexist. But 
for at least a few this is impossible. These differences involve incommensurable prac- 
tices, courses of action which cannot be ursued simultaneously any more than one can R play rugby and basketball by making t e same moves (see Calhoun, forthcoming a; 
Taylor, 1985). An analysis of practices, and more particularly of the various habituses 
.................... 
17. Curiously, the poststructuralism which informs so much of today's "new cultural history" is of about the 
same late 1960s vintage as the revival of historical sociology. 
18. This kind of historical understanding, with its emphasis on practice, shows the insufficiency of the 
familiar division posed by speech-act theory between constative and performative utterances. Poststruc- 
turalists are often keen to show how putative constatives (e.g. neutral truth claims) are really performarives 
(grabs for power). On Taylor's account we see that demostrating performativity need not be the end of 
analysis, and that performativity is not antithetical to a discourse of at least proximate truth or rightness. 
and implicit strategies which they reveal, is basic to establishing where the truly impor- 
tant lines of social conflict lie. But such an analysis of practices and strategies is not 
enough. It is still internal to a socio-cultural formation. It does not give us purchase, 
any more than typical poststructuralist approaches do, on the source and nature of 
cate orial transformations in history. Bourdieu's account of the various forms of capi- B tal, or example, generalizes the idea of capital for the analysis of any and all strrltegiz- 
ing in any historical or cultural setting (see Calhoun, forthcoming b). In this way, its 
undercuts even Bourdieu's own earlier analyses of the tensions between Kab le society 
and the incursions of French society and economic practices in Algeria l Bourdieu, 
1962, 1976). Bourdieu's scheme does not elucidate what, if anything, might be distinc- 
tive to modern capitalism, for example, or how the various individual and collective 
strategic pursuits which are the source of constant quantitative changes in social ar- 
rangements ever are reorganized by more basic qualitative changes. Bourdieu's work 
is similar, in this connection, to Foucault's. Both begin with analyses which make a 
good deal of contrasts between modernity and pre-or non-modern social forms. Yet 
each is led to universalize his critical analytic tools, the bodily inscription and discourse 
of power, and the convertible forms of capital. 
This is not just a question of where particular concepts or generations apply, a 
matter of scope statements (Walker and Cohen, 1985). The notion of historical con- 
stitution of categories is more basic. Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life, took on the challenge of giving a sociological account of the origins of the basic 
categories of thought. This sociologization of the Kantian categories is fascinating, and 
a neglected feature of Durkheim's thought. But it is crucial to note that Durkheim 
o erates primarily in static terms. His idea of "elementary forms" is not simply an idea 
o ! origins, but rather of universals which are more visible in their earlier and simpler 
appearances. His account of the categories--time and space, for example--makes the 
experience of living in society their basis. It does not focus on how variations in social 
organization or processes of historical transformation might reconstitute such basic 
categories. If this is an issue (within the neoKantian framework) for categories like 
space and time, it is at least as much so for "rationality," "individual," "nation," or 
"society." These and a host of other basic terms of analysis derive their specific mean- 
ings from processes of historical change (within specific cultural traditions and often 
refracted through highly developed intellectual frameworks), not from abstract defini- 
tion. 
One of the key differences of critical theory from traditional social theory is that 
the former demands a reflexive and historical grounding of its own categories, while 
the latter typically adopts transhistorical, putat~vely neutral and universally available 
categories. In other words, the critical theorists takes on the obligation to ask in strong 
senses why do I use these categories, and what are their implications, while the tradi- 
tional theorist asks simply have I defined my categories clearly. The division is evident 
even within the marxist tradition. Many marxists, thus, treat labor as a transhistorical, 
universal cate ory rather than one specific to capitalism. Reducing labor to work, 
however, decu f turalizes and dehistoricizes Marx's analysis of capitalism. It negates the 
effort of Capital to show how a categorical break distinguishes earlier accumulation of 
wealth from capitalism, and demands the new analytic cat ories and changed relation- 
ships among terms established in the opening chapter.'' Similarly, other theorists, 
recognizing cultural and historical diversity, have attempted to overcome its more 
serious implications by subsuming it into a common, often teleological, evolutionary 
framework. Unlike biological evolutionary theories, which stress the enormous qualita- 
tive diversity within the common processes of speciation, inheritance, mutation, selec- 
tion and so forth, sociological theories have generally relied on claimed universal fea- 
.................... 
19. Sce Postone, forthcoming, for a discussion of this. 
tures of all societies--like technology, held by Lenski, Lenski and Nolan (1990) to be 
the prime mover of evolutionary change--to act as basic, transhistorical variables. Such 
theories do indeed pay attention to the problem of establishing qualitative changes in 
patterns of social organization, but rather than showing the historical constitution and 
particularity of their own categories and analytical approach, they position themselves 
outside of history as neutral observers of the whole. 
As the foremost contem orary critical theorist, Habermas has been ambivalent 
on the issue of historical groun g ing of categories. His early work, especially The Struc- 
tural Transformation of the Public Sphere, works in exemplary historical fashion. It 
develops its concept as specific to a stage of capitalist development and state forma- 
tion, as varying among national histones, and as transformed by transitions within 
capitalism and state organization. In Habermas's later work, however, especially in his 
magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action, he sheds this historical constitu- 
tion of categories for an evolutionary construct. Although he wants to stress the special 
importance of the opposition between instrumental and communicative reason in the 
contemporary era, for example, he locates the distinction in a primordial split, a sort of 
communicative e ulsion from the Garden of Eden. His theory becomes more Rous- 
seauian and lessxarxian. It also becomes much less historically specific, with the 
result that he is no longer able within its terms to locate basic qualitative transforma- 
tions within history (such as the rise of capitalism). This has the effect of laying his 
theory open to the common poststructuralist (or postmodernist) charge of unjust univer- 
salization more basically even than the normative content on which most debate has 
focused. 
In his early work, Foucault did offer analyses of the historical constitution of 
categories, though as I suggested above; his later work abandoned this and few of his 
followers have kept it up. In general, the poststructuralist emphasis on difference (in 
itself saluta because modern discourse is so predominantly universalistic) is unable to 
ground itsel?: It is impossible within its strong claims as to the incommensurability of 
language games to construct a conclusive argument as to why we should in fact be 
tolerant or encouraging of other language games, or why other than by chance we 
should participate in any one. This then has the ironic result of granting "the other" 
legitimacy comparable to ourselves, but denying the possibility of meaningful discourse 
across the cultural gulf which separates us. 
What is needed to resolve this dilemma is the recognition that processes of com- 
munication and cross-cultural relations are themselves historical and part of materially 
consequential social practices. Translation is an inapt metaphor for what most impor- 
tant cross-cultural communication must mean. Any account of the confrontation of, 
say, aboriginal Australians with Europeans, must go beyond an attempt to translate cul- 
tural contents to a recognition that all communication was a part of relations which 
transformed each party, though asymmetrically; which were conducted by means of 
material power as well as cultural signification; and which focused on social practices 
not abstract discourse. To say such communication--or less extreme and less violent 
communication across basic cultural divides--is historical is to say that arriving at 
mutual understanding is not primarily a process of translation but rather of transforma- 
tion. Both arties must change into the sort of people who c n understand each other 
(and a goo d' deal else is likely to change in the same process). % 
If it is be able to deal effectively with either basic cross-cultural comparisons or 
fundamental historical transformations, social theory needs the capacity to ground its 
categories historically. This is something which historical sociology (and history) 
should provide. The category of the person is a good example. Inquiries of the kind 
begun by Marcel Mauss (cf. fn. above) need to be continued. Perhaps the most impor- 
.................... 
20. 1 have discussed this at much greater length in Calhoun (forthcoming b). 
tant contemporary exemplar of such work is Charles Taylor's recent The Sources of the 
Self. We could read this work as, among other things, an almost diametric opposition 
to Foucault on a crucial point. Foucault used historical studies to uncover the construc- 
tion of selves (and "the self') and then took this as the basis for an account of the un- 
reality of such constructed selves. He remained, ironically, caught within a "jargon of 
authenticity" (Adorno, 1973). Historicity was taken as a rebuttal of claimed authen- 
ticity which would have had to be "original" to be accepted (see discussion in Berman, 
1989). Taylor, by contrast, shows a whole series of subtle stations through which the 
modern notion of the self passes as it is constituted and reconstituted. Each of these, 
he suggests, must be treated as authentic. 
Taylor's inqui , however, remains within the realm of (a rather philosophical) 
intellectual history. raylor focuses conceptual attention on practices, but does not try 
to concretize and substantiate his account of the transformations of the self through a 
broader socio-cultural history. This is a problem with intellectual history more 
enerally, though current trends are in a positlve direction. Recent intellectual history 
%as branched out beyond semi-biographical attention to "great thinkers," placing their 
work not just in the context of "then tlmes," or their intellectual influences and adver- 
saries, but in that of a more theoretically serious analysis of systems of signification and 
discourse (see, e.g., White, 1978, 1987; LaCapra, 1983). But signification and discourse 
are still typically treated as though they exlsted independently of broader social and 
material processes.21 
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
Social theory needs not just an historical approach to culture and action as ob- 
jects of analysis, then, but an approach which opens up inquiry into the historical con- 
stitunion of basic theoretical categories. This 1s especially important for any theorist 
who aspires to be reflexively aware of the conditions of her or his own thought. A 
reflexivity limited to the here and now, or to a positive recognition of one's own inter- 
pretative tradition, cannot suffice as grounding for a truly critical theory. Historical 
sociology played a major role in reopening serious theoretical discourse about large 
scale social transformations. If it is to continue to push this forward, rather than being 
altogether domesticated within the positivity of contemporary sociological research, it 
needs to bring a much richer sense of culture and action to bear. These need to be con- 
ceived as art and parcel of social relations, not separate topics of inquiry, and still less 
as the tu I-! of other disciplines. 
.................... 
21. Intellectual history, in fact, has been a particularly active and productive field of  lare, fruitfully 
transcending its boundaries to as part of  the new cultural history (see discussion in Kramcr, 1989). 
Poststructuralist thought has played an important role in this. 
REFERENCES 
Abrarns, Philip 1982 Historical Sociology. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Abu-Lughod, Leila 1990 Unpublished conference paper. 
Adorno, T.W. 1973 The Jargon of Authenticity. Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univer- 
sity Press. 
Anderson, Peny 1974 Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: New Left Books. 
Bennett, Judith 1989 "Comment on Tilly: Who Asks the Questions for Women's 
History," Social Science History, Vol. 13 #4: 471-478. 
Berman, Marshall 1989 Modem Culture and Critical Theory. Madison, W: University 
of Wisconsin Press. 
Blau, Judith 1989 The Shape of Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
. Bourdieu, Pierre 1962 TheAZgenm. Boston: Beacon. 
1976 Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
P r e s s .  
1990 The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Calhoun, Craig 1987 "History and Sociology in Britain: A Review Article," Compara- 
tive Studies in Society and History, vol. 29 #3, pp. 615-625. 
1990 "Postmodernism as Peusdohistory," paper presented to the World 
C o n g r e s s  of Sociology, Madrid. 
forthcomin a "Culture, History and the Problem of Specificity in Social 
' I ' heory ,"  in S. Sei d man and D. Wagner, eds.: Postmodemism and General Social 
Theory. New York and Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
forthcoming b "Rationality, Habitus and Field of Power: The Question 
of Historical Specificity," in C. Calhoun, E. LiPuma and M. Postone, eds.: 
Towards a Rewive  Sociology: The Social Theory of Pierre Bourdieu. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Carrithers, Michael, Steven Collins and Steven Lukes, eds.: The Categov of the Person: 
Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge: Cambridge Un~versity Press. 
Coleman, James 1986 1986 "Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action," 
American Journal of Sociology 91: 1309-1335. 
Durkheim, Emile 1915 The Elementaryfroms of the Religious Life. New York: Free 
Press. 
Foucault, Michel 1978-1988 (4 vols.) The Hi~tory of Sexuality. New York: Pantheon. 
Geertz, Clifford 1973 "Ideology as a Cultural System," pp. 193-233 in The Interpreta- 
tion of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Giddens, Anthrony 1985 The Constitution of Society. Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press. 
Habermas, Jurgen 1962(1989) The STructural Transfornation of the Public Sphere. 
Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. 
1984, 1988 The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon. 
Hobsbawm, .Eric 1971 "From Social History to the Histo of Society,". p . 1-22 in 
M.W. Flinn and T.C. Smout, eds.: Essays in Social Xirrory. oxfor$ Oxford 
University Press. 
1978 "Should the Poor Organize?" New York Review of Books, March 23, 
pp. 44-49. 
Hunt, Lynn 1984 Politics, Culture and Clms in the French Revolution. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
,ed. 1989 The New Cultural History. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Jones, Gareth Stedman 1976 "From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History," 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27: 295-305. 
Kramer, Lloyd S. 1989 "Literature. Criticism. and Historical Imagination: The 
Literary Challenge of Hayden White and Dominick 
LaCapra," pp. 97-130 in L. Hunt, ed.: The New Cultural History. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
LaCapra, Dorninick 1983 Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Lenski, Gerhard, Jean Lenski and Patrick Nolan 1990 Human Societies, 6th Edition. 
, New York: .McGraw-Hill. 
McMichael, Philip 1984 Settlers and the Agrarian Question.. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mills, C. Wright 1958 The Sociological Imagination. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Ortner, Sherry 1984 'Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties," Comparative Studies 
of Society and History, Vol. 26: 126-66. 
Sahlins, Marshall 1985 Islands of History, U of Chicago Press. 
Scott, Joan Wallach 1988 Gender and the Politics of History. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Scott, James 1984 Weapons of the Weak. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sennett, Richard 1976 The Fall of Public Man. New York: Knopf. 
Sewell, William 1985 "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French 
Case," Joumul o Modem History, vol. 57 (1): 57-85. 
1986 '4 heory of Action, Dialectics and History: Comment on 
C o l e m a n , "  American Journal of Sociology Vol. 93: 166-172. 
Skocpol, Theda 1978 States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press. 
1982 "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Tlleory 
and Society, vol. 11: 265-84 
1985 "Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell," Journal of Modern His- 
tory, vol. 57(1): 86-96. 
1984 Viion and Method in Hktorical Sociology. New York: Cambridge. 
and Margaret Somers 1980 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macro- 
social Inquiry," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22 #2: 174-97. 
Steiner, George 1988 "Aspects of Counter-Revolution," pp. 129-154 in G. Best, ed.: 
The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and its Legacy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Taylor, Charles 1984 "Philosophy and its History," pp. 17-30 in R. Rorty, J.B. 
Schneewind and Q. Skinner, eds.: Philosophy in History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
1985 Philosoplty and the Human Sciences: Pl~ilosophical Papers, II. 
C a m b r i d g e :  Cambridge University Press. 
1989 The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modem Identity. 
T a m b r d i g e ,  MA: Harvard University Press. 
Thompson, E.P. 1978 The Poverty of Tlteory. New York: Monthly Review Press 
Tilly, Charles 1988 Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990. Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell. 
and Louise A. Tilly and Richard Tilly 1975 The Rebellious Century, 1830- 
1 9 3 0 .  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Tilly, Louise 1989 "Gender, Women's History, and Social History," Social Science His- 
tory, Vol. 13 #4: 439-463. 
Wacquant, Loic and Craig Calhoun 1989 "Intert, Rationalit, et Histoire: propos d'un 
debat Americain sur la thorie d'action" Loc Wacquant), Actes de la 
Recherche en Sciences Sociales, No. 78 
Walker, Henry and Bernard P. Cohen 1985 "Scope Statements: Imperatives for 
Evaluating Theory," American Sociological Review, vol. 50 #3: 288-301. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel 1974-1988 The Modem World Systern (3 vols.). New York: 
Academic Press. 
Weber, Samuel 1987 "Capitalizin History: Tlte Political Uncorlscio& pp. 40-58 in Itr- 
stitution and Irzterpretation. %I inneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
White, Hayden 1987 Tile Content ofthe Form: N ~ a t i v e  Discourse und Historical Rep- 
resentation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
1978 Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism . Baltimore: Johns 
H o p k i n s  University Press. 
Wuthnow, Robert 1989 Communities of Discourse: Ideolo and Social Structure in the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment and European Soci ism. Cambridge, MA: Har- 
vard University Press. 
P 
I 
PROGRAM ON THE 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
WORKING PAPER SBRIBS 
The Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations is an inter- 
disciplinary research program at the university of Michigan. Its faculty 
associates are drawn primarily from the departments of Anthropology, History, 
and Sociology, but also include members of several other programs in the 
humanities and social sciences. Its mission is to stimulate new inter- 
disciplinary thinking and research about all kinds of social transformations 
in a wide range of present and past societies. CSST Working Papers report 
current research by faculty and graduate student associates of the program. 
Many will be published elsewhere after revision. Working Papers are available 
for a fee of $2.00 for papers under 40 pages and for $3.00 for longer papers. 
To request copies of Working Papers, write to The Program on the Comparative 
Study of Social Transformations (CSST), 4010 LSA Building, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1382 or call (313) 936-1595. The CSST working , 
paper series is a part of the Center for Research on Soclal Organizations' 
working paper series. CRSO numbers are noted. 
1. "Program in Comparative Study of Social Transformations," William 
Sewell, Terrence McDonald, Sherry Ortner, and Jeffery Paige, 
May 87, 15 pp. (CRSO #344) 
2. "Labor History, Uneven Development, and the Autonomy of Politics: The 
Dockworkers of Nineteenth-Century Marseille," William Sewell, 
Jul 87, 45 pp. (CRSO #346) (Now in print as "Uneven 
Development, the Autonomy of Politics and the Dockworkers of 
Nineteenth-Century Marseille," American Historical Review 93:3 
(Jun 88), pp. 604-37.) 
3. "Coffee, Copper, and Class Conflict in.Centra1 America and Chile: A 
Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars in Chile and Zeitlin and 
Ratclif f 's   and lords and Capitalists, " Jeffery Paige, Sep 87, 
10 pp. (CRSO #347) 
4. "In Search of the Bourgeois Revolution: The Particularities of German 
History," Geoffrey Eley, Sep 87, 61 pp. (CRSO t350) 
5 .  "The Burdens of Urban History: The Theory of the State in Recent 
American Social History," Terrence McDonald, May 88, 50 pp. 
(CRSO #355) 
6. "History, Sociology, and Theories of Organization," Mayer Zald, May 88, 
42 pp. (CRSO 8357) 
7. "Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary 
Demographic Speculations," Maris Vinovskis, May 88, 55 pp. 
(CRSO #358) 
8. "Revolution and the Agrarian Bourgeoisie in Nicaragua," Jeffery Paige, 
42 pp. (CRSO 8363) 
9. "Nationalism and Class as Factors in the Revolution of 1917," Ronald 
Suny, Oct 88, 42 pp. (CRSO X365) 
10. "The Original Caste: Power, History, and Hierarchy in South Asia," 
Nicholas Dirks, Oct 88, 30 pp. (CRSO #367) 
11. "The Invention of Caste: Civil Society in Colonial India," Nicholas 
Dirks, Oct 88, 24 pp. (CRSO X368) 
12. "Sociology as a Discipline: Quasi-Science and Quasi-Humanities," Mayer 
Zald, Oct 88, 43 pp. (CRSO #369) 
"Constraints on Professional Power in Soviet-Type Society: Insights 
from the Solidarity Period in Poland," Michael Kennedy and 
Konrad Sadkowski, Nov 88, 37 pp. (CRSO #371) 
"Evolutionary Changes in Chinese Culture," Martin Whyte, Nov 88, 20 pp. 
(CRSO #372) 
"World Market, Class Conflict, and Rural Coercion in Post-Colonial 
Buenos Aires," Karl Monsra, Nov 88, 22 pp. (CRSO t373) 
"Ritual and Resistance: Subversion as'a Social Fact," Nicholas Dirks, 
Dec 88, 39 pp. (CRSO #375) 
"Social Transformations of Gender in Andean South America: A Working 
Annotated Bibliography," Janise Rurtig, Dec 88, 24 pp. (CRSO 
#376) 
"Labour History--Social History--Alltagsgeschichte: Experience-, 
Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday. A New Direction 
for German Social History?" Geoff Eley, Jan 89, 85 pp. (CRSO 
#378. (Now in print in Journal of Modern History 61 (Jun 89). 
ppp. 297-343.) 
"Notes on the Sociology of Medical Discourse: The Language of Case 
Presentation," Renee Anspach, Jan 89, 32 pp. (CRSO $379.) 
"World War TWO and the Deradicalization of American Labor: A 'Deviant 
Case' Study," Howard Kimeldorf, Feb 89, 45 pp. (CRSO X383) 
"Taking Stock: The First Year of CSST," Geoff Eley, Feb 89, 7 pp. 
(CRSO #384) 
"Immigration Research: A Conceptual Map," Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, Feb 
89, 15 pp. (CRSO $385) 
23. "Culture/Power/History. Series Prospectus," Sherry Ortner, Nicholas 
Dirks, and Geoff Eley, Mar 89, 4 pp. (CRSO #386) 
24. "A Feminist Perspective on Christopher Lasch, 'The Social Invasion of 
the Self'," Sherry Ortner, Apr 89, 6 pp. (CRSO t387) 
25. "Does Rational Choice Have Utility on the Margins?" Akos Rona-Tas, Apr 
89, 31 pp. (CRSO #388) 
26. Research Fellows Conference Panel on "The Politics of Social 
Transformation," Seong Nae Kim, Joanne Goodwin, Kathleen 
Canning, Jun 89. (CRSO $389) 
27. Research Fellows Conference Panel on "Struggle, Conflict, and . 
Constraints on Social Change," Anne Gorsuch and Sharon 
Reitman, Jun 89. (CRSO t390) 
28. -Research Fellows Conference Panel on'"Subordinate Actors and their 
Marginalization in Social Theory," Nilufer Isvan, Akos Rona- 
Tas, Cynthia Buckley, Theresa Deussen, and Mayfair Yang, Jun 
89.' (CRSO #391) 
29. "Toward a Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," 
William Sewell, Jun 89, 56 pp. (CRSO #392) 
30. "The Power of Individual Subjectivity and the Subjectivity of Power in 
Education," Peter Appelbaum, Jul 89, 40 pp. (CRSO t396) 
31. "Family Ideology, Class Reproduction, and the Suppression of Obscenity 
in Nineteenth Century New York," Nicola Beisel, Jul 89, 29 
pp. (CRSO 8397) 
32. "Author Meets Critics: Reactions to "Theory and Anthropology since the 
Sixties," Sherry Ortner, ed., Aug 89. (CRSO #398) 
33. "Does Social Theory Need History? Reflections on Epistemological 
Encounters in the Social Sciences," Margaret Somers, Aug 89, 
23 pp. (CRSO #399) 
34.  enhe her , History and Deconstruction: Joan Wallach Scott's Gender And 
The Politics Of his tor^," William Sewell, Aug 89, 20 pp. 
(CRSO #400) 
35. "The Social Origins Of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution 
in Central America," Jeffery Paige, Sep 89, 12 pp. (CRSO 
#405) 
36. "Max Weber Meets Feminism: A Reconstruction of Charisma," Cheryl Hyde, 
Sep 89, 24 pp. (CRSO #407) 
37. "Understanding Strikes In Revolutinary Russia," William Rosenberg, Sep 
89, 36 pp. (CRSO #408) 
38. "Child Labor Laws: A Historical Case Of Public Policy Implementation," 
Marjorie PlcCall-Sarbaugh and Mayer Zald, Oct 89, 41 pp. (CRSO 
8409 ) 
"Putting German (and Britian) Liberalism into Context: Liberalism, 
Europe, and the Burgeoisie, 1840-1914," Geoff Eley, Nov 89, 
39 pp. (CRSO #411) 
"Bringing Unions Back In (Or, Why We Need A New Old Labor History)," 
Howard Kimeldorf, Feb 90, 13 pp. (CRSO #414) 
"In Flight From Politics: Social History And Its Discontents," David 
Mayfield and Susan Thorne, Feb 90, 32 pp. (CRSO ~415)' 
"Nations, Politics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the 
Nineteenth Century," Geoff Bley, Apr 90, 34 pp. (CRSO #417) 
"Reviewing The Socialist Tradition," Geoff Bley, Apr 90, 29 pp. (CRSO 
$418) 
"Rethinking Labor History: Toward a Post-Materialist Rhetoric," 
William Sewell, May 90, 20 pp. (CRSO #421) 
"The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post 
Communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland," Michael Kennedy, 
Jul 90, 51 pp. (CRSO X425) 
"The Constitution of Critical Intellectuals: Polish Physicians, Peace 
Activists and Democratic Civil Society," Michael Kennedy, Apr 
90, 38 pp. (CRSO 8419) 
"Dominant Class and Statemaking in a Peripheral Area: Argentina after 
Independence," Karl Monsma, Aug 90, 50 pp. (CRSO #429) 
"Eastern Europe's Lessons for Critical Intellectuals," Michael Kennedy, 
Aug 90, 26 pp. (CRSO #430) 
"The Alternative in Eastern Europe at Century's Start: Brzozowski and 
Machajski on Intellectuals and Socialism," Michael Kennedy, 
Aug 90, 21 pp. (CRSO #431) 
"Collective Violence and Collective Loyalties in France: Why the French 
Revolution Made a Difference," William Sewell, Aug 90, 37 pp. 
(CRSO #432) 
"Transformations of Normative Foundations and Empirical Sociologies: 
Class, Stratification and Democracy in Poland," Michael 
Kennedy, Sep 90, 39 pp. (CRSO t433) 
"What We Talk About When We Talk About History: The Conversations of 
History and Sociology," Terrence McDonald, Oct 90, 27 pp. 
(CRSO #442) 
"Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthropologies and Anthropological 
Histories," Nicholas Dirks, Oct 90, 27 pp. (CRSO #443) 
"Narrativity, Culture, and Causality: Toward a New Historical 
Epistemology or Where is Sociology After the Historic Turn?" 
Margaret Somers, Oct 90, 26 pp. (CRSO 8444) 
"1s All the World a Text? From Sociology History to the History of 
Society Two Decades Later," Geoff Eley, Oct 90, 23 pp. (CRSO 
#445) 
"Who Shapes the Text?: Sherpas and Sahibs on Mount Everest," Sherry 
Ortner, Oct 90, 19 pp. (CRSO #446) 
"What Social Theory Needs from History Now: Culture and Action as 
Problems for Historical Sociology," Craig Calhoun, Oct 90, 19 
pp. (CRSO #447) 
"Three Temporalities: Toward a Sociology of the Event," William 
sewell, Oct 90, 24 pp. (CRSO t448) 
"The New Non-Science of Politics: On Turns to History in Political 
Science," Rogers Smith, Oct 90, 28 pp. (CRSO #449) 
"Feeling History: Reflections on the Western Culture Controversy," 
Renato Rosaldo, Oct 90, 7 pp. (CRSO #450) 
"Historicizing 'Experience'," Joan Scott, Oct 90, 19 pp. (CRSO #451) 
"The Past as Authority and as Social Critic: Stabilizing and 
Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument," Robert 
Gordon. Oct 90. 26 pp. (CRSO #452) 
"Discursive Forums, Cultural Practices: History and Anthropology in 
Literary Studies," Steven Mullaney, Oct 90, 17 pp. (CRSO 
#453 ) 
"Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: National Identity, 'Mixed 
Bloods' and the Cultural Genealogies of Europeans in Colonial 
Southeast Asia," Ann Stoler, Mag 91, 60 pp. (CRSO #454) 
"Cracking the Code Allegory and Political Mobilization in the Greek 
Resistance," Janet Hart, June 91, 48 pp. (CRSO #455) 
